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Abstract. In the recent years, non-proliferation of nuclear materials has become an important issue, regarding civilian fuel
cycle’s development. In addition, future nuclear energy systems’ and nuclear fuel cycles’ advancement should comply with
non-proliferation criteria. These requirements derive from the circumstance that nuclear power is considered to be a dual
purpose technology. Special attention to proliferation resistance has been paid since 2000, the main concerns arising from
plutonium stockpiles accumulation, and plutonium being considered among the most important materials related to non-
proliferation. There is an on-going debate about reactor-grade plutonium’s usability for nuclear explosives manufacturing.
Furthermore, there isn’t universally recognized and verified methodology for proliferation resistance assessment. On the
other hand, intrinsic material factors may play further role in strengthening fuel cycles’ proliferation resistance, since the
majority of the efforts in that area has gone so far into enhancing technical barriers. The article presents an analysis of the
change of the intrinsic barrier’s quality of reactor-grade PWRplutoniumas a function of fuel type, burn-up, and cooling time,
the main focus being on the physical components. The assessment has been carried out using three different methodologies
in an attempt to evaluate their applicability in intrinsic material barrier analysis.
Keywords: material barrier, proliferation resistance, reactor-grade plutonium.
1 Introduction
The relevance of the problems, associated with nuclear
materials’ non-proliferation is defined by the following
circumstances: (1) nuclear power is considered to be a dual
purpose technology [1, 2]; and (2) the probability for pro-
liferation creates certain obstacles before nuclear power’s
development in terms of creating negative perception of
nuclear technology [3]. On the other hand, proliferation
resistance is defined as a main requirement for Genera-
tion IV nuclear reactors and must be considered in the
process of selecting strategies and configurations for their
fuel cycles [4, 5]. In addition to those requirements, pro-
liferation resistance is among the core principles of nu-
clear power development and is an objective that should
be fulfilled by advanced fuel cycles [6, 7]. Proliferation re-
sistance also represents a necessary condition set by the
European commission that needs to be met, in order the
future advancement of nuclear energy in the European
Union to be guaranteed [8]. It is thought that proliferation
of nuclearmaterials is one of themost important problems
standing before the future progress of nuclear energy [9].
Special attention to proliferation resistance has been paid
since 2000 [10], the main concerns arising from plutonium
stockpiles accumulation [11], and plutoniumbeing consid-
ered among the most important materials related to non-
proliferation [9].
Increased proliferation resistance would enhance nuclear
power’s growth outlook [12]. Currently, main factor in
advanced fuel cycles’ development is finding equilibrium
between institutional measures (safeguards) and intrinsic
material barriers [13]. Enhancing proliferation resistance
would require implementation of internationally recog-
nized and verified methodology for measuring prolifera-
tion resistance, as well as an integrated approach in apply-
ing simultaneously intrinsic barriers and safeguards. The
need of such combined strategy is defined by the generally
accepted view that simple technical solutions for improv-
ing proliferation resistance do not exist [12].
2 Nuclear Materials
Perhaps one of the most comprehensive definitions of
nuclear materials is provided by the United States’ De-
partment of Energy (DOE). Their list includes: uranium
isotopic mixtures with any amount of 235U, 233U, 238Pu,
239Pu, 240Pu, 241Pu, 242Pu, 241Am, 243Am, Bk, 252Cf, Cm,
enriched Li, 237Np, Th, D, T, and all uranium located
within enrichment cascades [14]. That list effectively in-
cludes almost all isotopes that can be used for rapid crit-
ical mass attainment. Below these isotopes are listed as
in Ref. [15]: all plutonium isotopes, 235U, 233U, 237Np,
231Pa, 241Am, 243Am, 244Cm, 245Cm, 246Cm, 247Bk, and
251Cf. The listed uranium isotopes could be used in a sim-
plified “gun-type” weapon design, while 239Pu usage re-
quires that implosion technology be available. These tech-
nological specifications derive from the time needed to at-
tain critical mass [15,16]. The DOE also defines five classes
of materials, according to their state, purity, and concen-
tration of fissile isotopes: A – weapons materials, B – pure
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materials (metal slabs, casts, etc.), C – high-purity mate-
rials (e.g. carbides, oxides, nitrides, alloys, mixtures), D
– low-purity materials (e.g. low concentration solutions,
residues, etc.), and E – all other materials [14].
3 Non-Proliferation and Physical Protection
Nuclear materials’ non-proliferation is defined by the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a property of
a nuclear systemor facility that impedes nuclearmaterial’s
diversion and/or undeclared production, as well as mali-
cious applications of nuclear technology by a state aiming
to acquire nuclear weapon or other type of nuclear explo-
sive device. That definition implies that proliferation re-
sistance is ameasure of the difficulties that should be over-
come in order to develop and/or acquire nuclear weapon
or nuclear explosive device by means of civilian fuel cycle
and civilian technologies. Those difficulties include but
are not limited to technical and technological barriers, re-
quired skills, time, etc. Misusing nuclear fuel cycle could
include usage of materials, equipment, technological pro-
cesses, facilities, and knowledge related to civilian fuel cy-
cle [17]. In the case of nuclear proliferation the misuse of
nuclear material and/or nuclear facilities is carried out by
the owning country [18].
Sometimes, the meaning of ‘proliferation resistance’ is
mistakenly associated with ‘physical protection’, the lat-
ter being such property of nuclear power system that hin-
ders the theft of material suitable for constructing nu-
clear explosive device or device for spreading radioactive
substances in the environment. Physical protection also
impedes sabotages against nuclear facilities and prevents
clandestine transportation of nuclear and radioactive ma-
terial. In that case the perpetrator is a third party not own-
ing the facilities and/or the material, be it non-national
or national entity [17, 19]. Since the concept of ‘material
attractiveness’ can be associated to both measures but in
different context, it is essential that they be differentiated
when proliferation resistance assessment is made [18–20].
4 Plutonium Classification and Usability
There are two main approaches for plutonium classifica-
tion: the first relies on the 238Pu concentration in the
isotopic mixture since it defines the decay heat power
of the plutonium (‘heat spike’); the second classification is
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Figure 1. Isotopic vector of the plutonium, used for fresh MOX fuel fabrication [34] 
 
Figure 1. Isotopic vector of the plutonium, used for fresh MOX
fuel fabrication [34].
based on 240Pu concentration. The decay heat power could
be a limiting factor for the reliability and operability of
a hypothetical nuclear explosive device, while 240Pu de-
fines mainly the spontaneous neutron emission: excessive
amount of neutrons could initiate prematurely the chain
reaction (the so called ‘pre-detonation’) that could lead to
significant decrease of the yield of the hypothetical device
(‘fizzle yield’) [21]. A classification based on 240Pu concen-
tration that includes five plutonium grades, and is com-
monly used, has been published by Pellaud [22] and can be
seen in Table 1.
Table 1. Plutonium grades, according to 240Pu weight fraction
[22]
Plutonium grades 240Pu fraction Material’s usability
Super grade < 3% Weapons material
Weapons grade 3− 7% Weapons material
Fuel grade 7− 18% Practically usable
Reactor grade 18− 30% Possibly usable
MOX grade > 30% Unusable
In order to define 238Pu concentration threshold, above
which thematerial is unusable for nuclear explosive device
construction, impact assessments of increased decay heat
power onmaterial’s usability and hypothetical device’s re-
liability and operability have been carried out by Kessler et
al. [25] and Kimura et al. [9]. As a result, the authors rec-
ommend minimal values of 238Pu concentration in pluto-
nium mixtures in order to render them unusable. Those
values are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2. Minimal 238Pu concentration that ensures the pluto-
nium is unusable for weapon’s manufacturing
Kessler et al. Kimura et al.
[25] [9]
Low weapon technology 1.6 w% 2.0 w%
Medium weapon technology 3.2 w% 6.0 w%
High weapon technology 9.0 w% 15.0 w%
5 Proliferation Barriers
In order to d fine the level of civilian plutonium’s usabil-
ity for nuclear explosive device construction, it is neces-
sary to analyse those properties of the material that could
make it suitable for non-civilian applications. Most often,
the attributes linked to material’s proliferation resistance
are the bare critical mass of a sphere, its decay heat, the
spontaneous neutron emission, and the radiological bar-
rier [3, 11]. Those factors compose the so called isotopic
barrier to proliferation. Some of the factors influence ma-
terial’s usability, others – the probability for acquisition,
transportation, and reprocessing [26]. The main proper-
ties of the most important plutonium isotopes are listed
in Table 3.
The proliferation barriers can be divided in intrinsic and
extrinsic [17, 26]. The intrinsic barriers may be physical –
related to the properties of the material, and technical –
related to the properties of the nuclear facilities, the ac-
cess to the facilities, and the availability of specialists with
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Table 3. Basic properties of main plutonium isotopes
Half-life Bare critical Bare critical Bare critical Spontaneous neutron Decay heat Dose rate∗
Isotope [22] mass [22] mass [21] mass [30] emission [22] power [22] [34]
[yrs.] [kg] [kg] [kg] [(n/kg)/s] [W/kg] [rad/h]
238Pu 87.70 10.00 9.03 9.72 2,600,000 560.00 0.211000
239Pu 24 100.00 10.00 10.23 10.11 22 1.90 0.000395
240Pu 6 560.00 40.00 31.45 37.43 910,000 6.80 0.007170
241Pu 14.40 10.00 12.24 13.09 49 4.20 0.001450
242Pu 376 000.00 100.00 62.20 89.98 1,700,000 0.10 0.005450
∗This is the dose rate of 20% of the critical mass at 1 m distance from the source.
adequate knowledge and skills, and time for device’s de-
velopment [17]. The most important factors of the intrin-
sic barrier are linked to material’s properties; in total the
isotopic, chemical, radiological, and weight factors have a
relative share of 63.5 %. Other significant factor, with its
relative weight of 18.1%, is the available inventory [26].
6 Objectives, Methodologies, and Input Data
6.1 Objectives
The main objectives of the current study are:
1. To evaluate the change in the material barrier of
plutonium (but not its utility), obtained during nor-
mal operation of a reference commercial PWR, as a
function of fuel type (UOX/MOX), burn-up (30,000 –
60,000 MWd/tHM), and cooling time (up to 30 years
after discharge);
2. To try to compare different evaluationmethods: iso-
topic criteria, ‘Figure of Merit’ methodology, and
multi-attribute utility analysis.
6.2 Isotopic criteria
Since it is thought that aside of the countries, possessing
nuclear weapons, only low weapons technology could hy-
pothetically be present [25, 27], in the following assess-
ment the low technology values of 238Pu concentration,
defined by Kessler et al. [25] and Kimura et al. [9] have been
used as benchmarks (Table 2). Furthermore, the values of
240Pu concentrations defining the reactor-grade and the
MOX-grade plutonium (Table 1) have been used as an ad-
ditional benchmark.
Although high spontaneous neutron emission results in
higher pre-detonation probability, the values of 240Pu
concentration cannot be used as a standalone measure for
the material barrier’s quality for the following reasons:
• Pre-detonation precludes achieving nominal explo-
sive yield of the device but does not eliminate a
nuclear explosion [16, 28]: analyses carried out by
Mark [23] and Kessler et al. [24,25] show that if pre-
detonation occurred in a hypothetical nuclear ex-
plosive device with nominal yield of 20 kt, the ‘fiz-
zle’ yield would be between 0.12 kt and 0.54 kt (or
between 0.6% and 2.7% of the nominal yield of the
hypothetical device);
• Although 240Pu is the most abundant even plu-
tonium isotope in the examined vectors, it is not
the only isotope contributing to plutonium’s over-
all spontaneous neutron emission (see Table 3);
• Pre-detonation is a considerable factor that needs
to be taken into account if the proliferator’s goal is
constructing a storable device with predictable yield
[18] but is not by itself a limiting factor if the goal
is to construct a device with any above-threshold
yield (the threshold yield is the maximal explosive
power achievable with conventional chemical ex-
plosives). It is accepted that pre-detonation even
in low technology weapons would result in above
threshold yields in most of the cases [29];
• Another factor is that even though the pre-
detonation limits the explosive yield, the destruc-
tion radius is proportional to the cube root of the
yield: a thousand-fold yield decrease leads to ten-
fold decrease of the destruction radius [28]. That’s
why 240Pu criteria had been selected only as an ad-
ditional benchmark.
6.3 ‘Figure of Merit’
The ‘Figure of Merit’ methodology has been developed by
a team from USA’s Los Alamos National Laboratories. It
is used to assess the material’s usability for the construc-
tion of a nuclear explosive device by a nation or a sub-
national group. The methodology uses two criteria, FOM1
and FOM2, in order to assess the material. They are calcu-
lated using Eqs. (1) and (2). These criteria include several
intrinsic factors such as bare critical mass, spontaneous
neutron fraction, decay heat, and dose rate. The first cri-
terion assesses the material’s usability when the explosive
yield is of little importance and pre-detonation is not an
issue, while the second criterion assesses the case when
nominal yield and storability are desirable [18,19,29]. This
effectively means that FOM1 criterion does not take into
account the effects of the spontaneous neutron emission,
while FOM2 could be used to assess the impact of even plu-
tonium isotopes on thematerial barrier. The present anal-
ysis has been carried out using the algorithm applied in
Ref. [30].
FOM1 = 1− lg
[ M
800
+
M ·DH
4500
+
M
50
(DR
500
) 1
lg 2
]
(1)
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FOM2 = 1− lg
[ M
800
+
M ·DH
4500
+
M · S
6.8× 106 +
M
50
(DR
500
) 1
lg 2
]
(2)
In Eqs. (1) and (2)M is the bare critical mass of a sphere in
kg, DH is the specific decay heat in W/kg, S is the spon-
taneous neutron fraction in (n/s)/kg, and DR is the dose
rate of 20% of the bare critical mass at a distance of 1 m
from the source in rad/h. The higher the criteria value,
the higher the material’s usability [18,19,29]. The criteria
values have approximate correspondence to DOE’s mate-
rial classes (Table 4). Some FOM reference values could be
found in Refs. [18, 19, 29, 30]. In the present analysis the
values of FOM1 and FOM2 are used as a metric to investi-
gate the change in the material barrier’s quality.
Table 4. Approximate correspondence between ‘Figure of Merit’
material evaluation and DOE classes [18]
FOM value DOE class
> 2 ∼ B
[1;2] ∼ C
[0;1] ∼ D
< 0 ∼ E
6.4 Multi-attribute utility analysis (MAUA)
This tool has been developed by Charlton et al. as a means
to assess the nuclear security (including both proliferation
resistance and physical protection aspects) of nuclear pro-
cesses. The analysis evaluates 14 utility functions, linked
to proliferation barriers, each utility function having an
assigned relative weight (Table 5). The utility functions,
their assigned weights, and the complete calculation algo-
rithm are fully described in Ref. [31]. The sum of the prod-
ucts of the relative weights and utility functions’ values is
used as a metric named ‘static proliferation resistance’ and
is calculated using Eq. (3); the sum value belongs to the
interval [0;1]. The closer the value is to unity, the better
is the quality of the barrier. This metric is applied in the
present analysis in a similar fashion as the ‘Figure ofMerit’
criteria – as ameans to evaluate the change in thematerial
barrier’s quality.
PRi =
J∑
j=1
wj uj(xij) . (3)
NS =
∑I
i=1mi ∆ti PRi∑I
i=1mi ∆ti
. (4)
In fact, the static proliferation resistance is used as a cri-
terion to evaluate the proliferation resistance of the i-th
stage of a nuclear process (e.g. spent fuel reprocessing as a
step in the closed fuel cycle). Then, using Eq. (4), the total
nuclear security of the process can be evaluated. In the
present analysis, the methodology is adapted, assuming
that the nuclear process consists of a single stage: pluto-
nium storage. Because the aim is to assess the material
barrier, the storage time is disregarded, thus effectively
Table 5. Utility functions used in themulti-attribute utility anal-
ysis [31]
Relative
Unit of weight
No Utility function (ui) measure (wij )
1 Attractiveness according to DOE
(material class) [—] 0.10
2 Material decay heat, due to
plutonium [W] 0.05
3 Relative weight fraction of even
plutonium isotopes [—] 0.06
4 Fissile material concentration [SQ/t] 0.10
5 Dose rate [(rem/h)/SQ] 0.08
6 Size/weight [—] 0.06
7 Frequency of material’s quantity
measurement [—] 0.09
8 Measurement uncertainty [SQ/yr.] 0.10
9 Fissile material separability [—] 0.03
10 Share of process steps, requiring
material accounting [—] 0.03
11 Probability for unidentified
material movement [—] 0.07
12 Physical barriers [—] 0.10
13 Inventory [SQ] 0.05
14 Type of fuel reloading [—] 0.06
equating the total nuclear security to the static prolifera-
tion resistance. Furthermore, in order to achieve relative
comparability between the ‘Figure of Merit’ criteria and
the static proliferation resistance, the value of some utility
functions concerning physical protection aspects has been
set to unity.
Unlike isotopic benchmarks and ‘Figure of Merit’ method-
ology that are applicable only to purifiedmaterials, i.e. the
assessment is carried out only for purified metallic plu-
tonium, the multi-attribute utility analysis can be used
to evaluate materials in various forms, including pluto-
nium embedded in spent fuel (i.e. not separated mate-
rial) kept in spent fuel storage facility. That is due to the
initial purpose of the multi-attribute analysis – to eval-
uate multi-stage nuclear processes where multiple mate-
rial form transformations may occur. This allows evaluat-
ing and comparing the material barrier of purified metal-
lic plutonium and non-separated metal that is contained
within spent fuel assemblies.
In Eqs. (3) and (4)wj is the relative weight of the j-th util-
ity function, uj(xij) is the value of the j-th utility func-
tion for the i-th stage of the nuclear process, PRi is the
static proliferation resistance of the i-th stage of the nu-
clear process, NS is the total nuclear security of the nu-
clear process,mi is the mass of nuclear material in the i-
th stage of the nuclear process, and ∆ti is the time period
that the material spends in the i-th stage of the nuclear
process.
6.5 Input data
The parameters of the reference PWR, used as input data
in the analyses, are shown in Table 6. The isotopic com-
positions of the various plutonium mixtures and the ma-
terial inventories have been calculated using the SCALE6.1
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Table 6. Input parameters of the analysed reference PWR
Gross electric power [MW] 1000
Gross thermodynamic efficiency of the power unit [%] 32.6
Load factor of the power unit [%] 85.0
Enrichment of uranium fuel [%] 4.4
Plutonium weight share in MOX fuel [%] 7.23
module ORIGEN-ARP by applying the standardised built-
in cross-section libraryw17×17 [32]. In order to calculate
FOM1 and FOM2 values, the algorithm used in the analy-
sis, presented in Ref. [30], has been applied, using the bare
critical masses from Ref. [33].
Concerning the multi-attribute analysis, in order to neu-
tralize the attributes, linked to physical protection and to
differentiate between metallic plutonium and plutonium,
embedded in spent fuel, the following values of several
utility functions have been set:
1. For metallic plutonium:
(a) DOE Attractiveness – x1 = 0 (see Ref. [31];
metallic plutonium is material class B, accord-
ing to DOE’s classification [14]);
(b) Size/weight – x6 = 0;
(c) Frequency of material’s quantity measure-
ment – x7 = 1 (this function is not an aspect
of the material barrier);
(d) Fissile material separability – x9 = 0 (the ma-
terial is in metallic form, see Ref. [31]);
(e) Share of process steps, requiring material ac-
counting – x10 = 1 (this function is not an as-
pect of thematerial barrier; also, for the analy-
sis’ purposes it’s been assumed that the exam-
ined nuclear process is a single-stage process);
(f) Probability for unidentified material move-
ment – x11 = 1 (recommended value by
Charlton et al. [31]);
(g) Physical barriers – x12 = 0 (it is assumed
that the material is accessible because it is in
metallic form; although the physical barriers
are not aspects of the proliferation resistance,
they are function of the material’s form);
(h) Type of fuel reloading – x14 = 1 (batch core
loading is assumed, in spite of thematerial be-
ing in metallic form; that’s because the fre-
quency of obtaining plutoniumdepends on the
core reloading pattern – batch or continuous.
However, the same value for x14 has been set
for embedded plutonium as well.);
Table 7. Main Plutonium isotopes’ dose rates [36]
X-ray dose rate Gamma dose rate Neutron dose rate
[(mSv/h)kg] [(mSv/h)kg] [(mSv/h)kg]
238Pu 5700.00 240.00 640.00
239Pu 89.00 3.20 0.01
240Pu 72.00 0.80 300.00
241Pu 0.00 120.00 0.00
242Pu 1.30 0.00 310.00
(i) In order to calculate the value x8 (utility func-
tion u8 ‘Measurement uncertainty’), uncer-
tainty of 0.2% is assumed, as recommended in
Ref. [35]. For x5 calculation (utility function
u5 ‘Dose rate’) the values listed in Table 7 have
been used.
2. For plutonium, embedded in spent fuel matrix:
(a) DOE Attractiveness – x1 = 1;
(b) Size/weight – x6 = 1;
(c) Fissile material separability – x9 = 1 (the ma-
terial has not been separated from the spent
fuel matrix);
(d) Physical barriers – x12 = 0.75 (the material is
in some type of spent fuel storage facility, see
Ref. [31]);
(e) Measurement uncertainty – x8 = 0 (it is as-
sumed that there is no uncertainty when item
accounting is applied, i.e. tracking down the
number of items (fuel assemblies, spent fuel
storage canisters, etc.) not themass of thema-
terial itself, following the recommendation by
Charlton et al. [31])
7 Results and Discussion
7.1 Isotopic criteria
The results of the benchmarking of the various examined
plutonium vectors to different isotopic criteria are shown
in Figures 2 – 5. The figures show the compliance of pluto-
nium, obtained during UOX fuel operation with the crite-
ria of Kessler et al. and Kimura et al. (Figure 2), the grade
of plutonium, generated by UOX burning (Figure 3), the
compliance of plutonium, obtained duringMOX fuel oper-
ation with the criteria of Kessler et al. and Kimura et al.
(Figure 4), and the grade of plutonium, generated by MOX
burning (Figure 5).
Figure 2 unequivocally shows increased 238Pu weight frac-
tion with increased burn-up as well as its gradual decrease
with cooling time. Those effects are expected, given the
extended length of the fuel cycle, required for improv-
ing burn-up, and the subsequent decay of 238Pu (T½ =
84.4 years). The important observations are linked to
the impact those phenomena have on plutonium’s ma-
terial barrier. At the beginning of the cooling period –
around the 110th day after discharge, the minimal burn-
up at which the produced plutonium satisfies both crite-
ria is 50,000 MWd/tHM. At the 30textth year after fuel’s
discharge that is still the case although 50,000 MWd/tHM
burn-up complies only marginally with the more strin-
gent Kimura criterion. That clearly demonstrates the
barrier deterioration over time. This effect, caused by
238Pu weight fraction decrease, permits to conservatively
assume that the minimal burn-up providing satisfactory
compliance with both criteria at the 30th year following
discharge is 55,000 MWd/tHM.
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Figure 2. Correspondence of UOX fuel plutonium to Kessler and Kimura criteria 
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Figure 3. Correspondence of UOX fuel plutonium to plutonium grades 
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Regarding the plutonium, obtained by MOX fuel irradi-
ation, all examined mixtures have 238Pu concentrations
above the thresholds set by both criteria, irrespective of
the burn-up and cooling time (Figure 4). Those results
confirm the higher quality of MOX-grade plutonium’s ma-
terial barrier. That’s due to the stability of 238Pu concen-
tration in the entire range of examined burn-ups and cool-
ing time durations.
According to 240Pu concentration, all plutoniummixtures,
obtained from uranium fuel, fall into reactor-grade class
(Figure 3). The observed trends for increasing 240Pu con-
centration with burn-up and cooling time have been ex-
pected, since the concentrations of heavier plutonium iso-
topes in uranium fuel rise with irradiation, and the to-
tal plutonium mass diminishes with cooling time (see
Ref. [33]), mainly due to 241Pu decay (T½ = 14.4
years). The 240Pu weight fraction increase leads to rela-
tive strengthening of the material barrier. However, as al-
ready noted in Section 6.2, this factor doesn’t have inde-
pendent influence. Regarding plutonium from spent MOX
fuel, generally all investigatedmixtures can be classified as
MOX-grade (240Pu weight fraction above 30%), with 240Pu
fraction increasing with cooling time. That phenomenon
additionally improves MOX plutonium’s material barrier
quality, rendering the material virtually unusable for non-
civilian usage.
Based on isotopic criteria benchmarking, the following
conclusions can be formulated:
• The material barrier quality of plutonium from
uranium spent fuel with low to medium burn-up
(30,000 to 45,000 MWd/tHM) is not sufficient to in-
dependently guarantee the proliferation resistance
of the material. However, that doesn’t necessarily
imply that utilizing this plutonium for non-civilian
purposes might be feasible;
Table 8. Values of FOM1 and FOM2 criteria as a function of burn-up, cooling time, and fuel type
Cooling time
FOM1 FOM2
Burn-up 0.3 1.0 3.0 10.0 30.0 0.3 1.0 3.0 10.0 30.0
[MWd/tHM] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.]
UOX
30,000 2.39 2.39 2.39 2.40 2.42 1.29 1.28 1.28 1.27 1.26
35,000 2.34 2.33 2.33 2.34 2.35 1.22 1.22 1.21 1.20 1.18
40,000 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.28 2.30 1.16 1.16 1.15 1.14 1.12
45,000 2.23 2.22 2.22 2.22 2.24 1.11 1.11 1.1 1.09 1.07
50,000 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.19 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.02
55,000 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.13 1.02 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.96
60,000 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.10 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.93
MOX
30,000 2.09 2.09 2.08 2.09 2.09 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.84
35,000 2.09 2.09 2.08 2.08 2.09 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.82
40,000 2.08 2.08 2.07 2.07 2.08 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.80
45,000 2.08 2.08 2.07 2.07 2.08 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.78
50,000 2.08 2.08 2.07 2.07 2.07 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.77
55,000 2.08 2.07 2.06 2.06 2.06 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.79 0.74
60,000 2.08 2.07 2.06 2.06 2.06 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.78 0.73
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• The easiest approach for improving the quality of
the material barrier of plutonium from spent ura-
nium fuel is increasing burn-up. That would add to
the feasibility of increased burn-up fuels;
• The material barrier of plutonium from MOX fuel
has significantly superior quality than that of plu-
tonium from uranium fuel. However, the quality is
weakly influenced by burn-up and cooling time.
7.2 ‘Figure of Merit’
The calculated FOM1 and FOM2 values are summarised in
Table 8. The data show a general trend of decreasing cri-
teria values, i.e. increasing quality of the material barrier.
The values show relatively small barrier quality deterio-
ration with cooling time. It is evident that burn-up has
more pronounced influence on the quality of the barrier.
The values of both criteria have been averaged over the
30-year spent fuel cooling period in order to analyse more
thoroughly the effects of burn-up. The results are shown
in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Figure 6 represents the change
of the average FOM1 value as a function of fuel burn-up.
A clear, almost linear decrease in material’s attractiveness
can be observed for both plutonium from UOX and MOX
spent fuels; in other terms, the material barrier’s quality
visibly improves with burn-up increase. The change in the
quality of plutonium produced from uranium fuel is very
well pronounced, especially when spontaneous neutron
emission is not considered (FOM1). The quality of the bar-
rier of plutonium from spent MOX fuel basically remains
constant with burn-up increase. Those results correspond
with the trends outlined by the isotopic benchmarks (Sec-
tion 7.1). The impact of the spontaneous neutron emis-
sion on the quality of thematerial barrier can be examined
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Figure 6. Change of 30-year average FOM1 as a function of burn-
up.
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Figure 7. Change of 30-year average FOM2 as a function of burn-
up.
in Figure 7. In that case the quality of plutonium from
spent MOX fuel also visibly increases with burn-up. Also,
the FOM2 values are around two times lower than FOM1
values. That observation is unambiguous confirmation of
the spontaneous neutron emission’s contribution to ma-
te ial barrier’s quality. However, the limited importance
of the neutron emission (see Section 6.2) should be kept in
mind.
Table 9. Static proliferation resistance of metal plutonium and pluto ium embedded in spent fuel matrix as a function of burn-up,
cooling time, and fuel type
Cooling time
Metal Spent fuel
Burn-up 0.3 1.0 3.0 10.0 30.0 0.3 1.0 3.0 10.0 30.0
[MWd/tHM] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.] [yrs.]
UOX
30,000 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83
35,000 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84
40,000 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.85
45,000 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.87
50,000 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88
55,000 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
60,000 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89
MOX
30,000 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.82
35,000 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83
40,000 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84
45,000 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84
50,000 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85
55,000 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
60,000 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86
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7.3 Multi-attribute analysis. Inventory and material form
impact
The MAUA results for metallic and non-separated pluto-
nium are shown in Table 9. Similarly to the ‘Figure of
Merit’ values, the static proliferation resistance is virtu-
ally independent from cooling time. Because of that, sim-
ilar approach is undertaken and the static proliferation re-
sistance values are averaged over the 30-year cooling pe-
riod. The dependence of static proliferation resistance
from burn-up can be seen in Figure 8 for metallic pluto-
nium and in Figure 9 for non-separated plutonium.
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Figure 8. Change of 30-year average static proliferation resistance of separated plutonium as a 
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Figure 8. Change of 30-year average static proliferation resis-
tance of separated plutonium as a function of burn-up.
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Figure 9. Change of 30-year average static proliferation resis-
tance of non-separated plutonium as a function of burn-up.
The figures show that the character of the change of bar-
rier’s quality of metallic plutonium coincides with that
of non-separated plutonium. Other significant observa-
tion is that, unlike the isotopic benchmarking and ‘Figure
of Merit’ results, here the proliferation resistance of UOX
plutonium is greater. The most likely reason for this dis-
crepancy is the much greater plutonium inventory gener-
ated bymixed oxide fuel operation (Ref. [33]) which is con-
sidered in theMAUAanalyses but is disregarded in isotopic
benchmarking and ‘Figure of Merit’ assessments.
Other observation that can be made on the basis of the
graphical data representation is that the improvement rate
of MOX plutonium’s barrier quality decelerates with burn-
up increase. Concerning p utonium, generated from ura-
nium fuel, the graph can be divided in two approximately
linear sections with inflexion point at 50,000 MWd/tHM
where the improvement rate decreases. When the ma-
terial form is factored in, a higher rate of improvement
with burn-up is observed for metallic plutonium (11.9%
for plutonium from uranium fuel and 7.54% for plutonium
fromMOX fuel, in comparisonwith 7.7% and 4.9% for non-
separated plutonium respectively). However, the contri-
bution of the material form to the overall static prolifera-
tion resistance is significant and is illustrated in Figure 10.
If the plutonium is embedded within the spent fuel ma-
trix the relative quality of the barrier is between 42.8% and
48.5% higher depending on fuel type and burn-up. The
relative contribution is greater for plutonium from spent
mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel and is inversely pro-
portional to the burn-up.
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Figure 10. Relative increase of the static proliferation resistance
of embedded plutonium compared to metallic plutonium.
8 Conclusions
An evaluation of the material barrier of plutonium gen-
erated in a reference PWR as a function of nuclear fuel’s
type and burn-up, and spent fuel’s cooling time has been
carried out using three different methodologies: isotopic
benchmarking, ‘Figure of Merit’, and multi-attribute util-
ity analysis. Based on the results the following conclusions
can be formulated:
• Based on isotopic benchmarking the material bar-
rier of plutonium obtained by SNF with low to
medium burn-up (30–45 GWd/tHM) is not sufficient
to render the material unattractive; however, that
does not confirm plutonium’s feasibility for non-
civilian applications.
• The quality of the barrier of plutonium generated by
UOX increases linearly with burn-up (faster isotopic
vector degradation) which contributes to increased
burn-up feasibility.
• If plutonium’s inventory is not taken into account,
the MOX plutonium material barrier quality is
greater.
• Generally, burn-up has little impact on MOX pluto-
nium barrier’s quality.
• The impact of the considered cooling time period
(up to 30 yrs.) in general is not significant which al-
lows averaging the criteria values over the period.
• The protection by 240Pu improves with cooling time
but increased pre-detonation probability by itself
62
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is not enough to substantially impact the barrier’s
quality since the potential yield of a hypothetical
device would be above threshold levels.
• Given the results of the multi-attribute utility anal-
ysis, the material’s inventory should not be disre-
garded in those assessments.
• The form of the material has unsurprisingly signifi-
cant impact on the proliferation barrier – the pluto-
nium embedded in SNF and stored within spent fuel
assemblies/storage casks has nearly 50% better bar-
rier quality.
• The rate of barrier quality increase with burn-up is
higher for refined metal plutonium.
• Plutonium recycling in MOX improves overall bar-
rier quality becausematerial’s decay heat, bare criti-
cal mass, dose rates, and neutron emission increase.
• Generally, the trends found by applying three differ-
ent methods correspond well with each other (ex-
cept the case when plutonium’s inventory has been
taken into account).
• Improved material barrier contributes to the pro-
liferation resistance of nuclear fuel cycles. How-
ever, that doesn’t imply weaker physical protec-
tion/safeguards.
• The physical protection analyses should take into
consideration the properties of the material.
• The question of LWR reactor-grade plutonium’s us-
ability remains unresolved.
• The single recycling of plutonium, obtained by high-
burn uranium fuel, in PWR in the form of MOX
fuel with subsequent continuous storage of the sec-
ondary spent fuel appears to be an existing fuel cycle
option that provides relatively good levels of mate-
rial barrier quality.
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